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NOTES
THE MODERN DRUG INDUSTRY'S
INCREASED EXPOSURE TO DAMAGES
I. THE PROBLEM
A. The Current Drug Market
Thirty or forty years ago when the number of new drug products
was small, and distribution facilities were slower and more limited,
pharmaceutical houses produced, for the most part, drugs which had
withstood the test of time. Under these circumstances, when an infre-
quent case of injury resulted, an error in the manufacturing process
could likely be blamed. Further, when a new product was marketed,
wide acceptance among the medical profession and by the public was
likely to be years in coming. The result was that there was ample time
to correct production and testing difficulties and to discover any unfor-
seen reactions on human users while the number of consumers who
might be affected was relatively limited.'
Modern technology and the incursion into every facet of day-to-
day living is apparent to all. Thus, it is not surprising to discover that
today's drug industry has incorporated many of the advanced tech-
niques of manufacturing and marketing in dispensing their various
products to an ever growing number of consumers. Technological adv-
ances have produced countless new products to aid the fight against
disease. In 1965, it was estimated that as much as 90% of prescriptions
being filled called for drugs which were nonexistent fifteen years ago.
2
In the twenty-four years from 1940 to 1964, the amount spent on
prescription drugs increased from $150 million to $2.2 billion. 3 In 1957,
half the sales volume of the Eli Lilly Company consisted of products
which were introduced within the preceding five years.4 In addition to
1. Willis, Product Liability Without Fault: Some Problems and Proposals, 15
FOOD DRUG COsm. L.J. 648, 655-56 (1960) (hereinafter cited as Willis).
2. Statement of George P. Larrick, Commissioner of Food and Drugs, Hearings
on Drug Safety Before Subcomm. on Intergovernmental Affairs, House Committee on
Governmental Operations, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 14 (1964).
3. Id.
4. ELI LILLY & Co., REPORT TO THE SHAREHOLDERS 7 (1957).
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emphasizing the fruits of modern research, these figures illustrate the
tremendous advances in production and distribution methods of the
modern drug industry. All of this sophistication has brought with it an
increased risk of liability to the manufacturer in the products liability
field. "Thus, in a very real sense, the American drug industry is in
danger of becoming a victim of its own excellence." 5
B. The Manufacturer's Exposure to Liability
Judicial handling of products liability suits has, in general,
brought about that curious mixture of tort and warranty law known
as strict liability. The courts have generally been cautious in this area
because of the important policy considerations involved, 6specially the
need to balance protection of the consumer against the possible eco-
nomic consequences of strict liability to manufacturers.'
Liability without fault was first introduced in the drug industry in
1960 in Gottsdanker v. Cutter Laboratories.' A California jury found
specifically that Cutter had not been either directly or indirectly negli-
gent, but that in producing and marketing its polio myelitis vaccine
which contained live polio virus, it had impliedly warranted that the
vaccine was both merchantable and fit for its intended purpose.' On
appeal, it was contended by Cutter that, as a matter of public policy,
if drug makers are held strictly liable for the drugs they produce,
further development of new products would be retarded. The court's
answer in rejecting this argument was that the warranty in question was
not one for a cure, but merely that the vaccine would not cause the
disease that it was designed to prevent. 9 This decision infinitely broad-
ened the spectrum of the drug manufacturer's liability for his product,
and to the extent that the Gottsdanker holding is applied in other
jurisdictions, the economic consequences to the drug manufacturer can
5. Willis, supra note I, at 649.
6. Note, A Federal Consumer Products Liability Act, 7 HARV. J. LEGIS. 568, 568-
69 (1970).
7. 182 Cal. App. 2d 602, 6 Cal. Rptr. 320 (1960); 13 STAN. L. REv. 645 (1961)
[hereinafter cited as 13 STAN. L. RaV.]. Gottsdanker was the appeal by Cutter Laborato-
ries of a jury verdict for two young children who had contracted polio after being
vaccinated with the Salk-type polio vaccine made by Cutter. The cause of the accident
was live polio virus in the vaccine itself.
8. Id. at 323.
9. Id. at 326.
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be severe or even fatal. An examination of three disastrous incidents
of the recent past involving drug side effects demonstrates the impact
of broadened products liability on the drug industry in terms of stag-
gering numbers of plaintiffs and catastrophic damage awards. The
three incidents involve the Salk vaccine produced by Cutter, and MER-
29 (triparonol) and thalidomide produced by the Richardson-Merrell
Company.
The discovery of the polio vaccine by Dr. Jonas Salk brought relief
to parents across the nation who lived in fear of the summer-long
rampages of infantile paralysis which left countless people, mostly
children, crippled and disabled. Innoculations with the Salk vaccine
made by Cutter Laboratories of California began in the summer of
1955. However, as a result of using Cutter's product, some of those
vaccinated contracted the disease itself, and were crippled in varying
degrees. Before the legal proceedings ended, Cutter was the subject of
some sixty law suits for its role as the manufacturer of the vaccine.' 0
The Gottsdanker decision was only the beginning, and the award of
$147,000, only a small indication of things to come." In one case alone,
a Los Angeles jury awarded an eleven-year-old boy $675,000.12 All
claims filed against Cutter totaled about $11.8 million.' 3 Like all sub-
stantial drug manufacturers, Cutter carried large amounts of products
liability insurance, but by June 1961, it was apparent that its insurance
would soon be exhuasted. 4 At that time, claims had been paid totalling
$1,226,900 in the twenty-eight suits in which settlement had been
reached.' 5 In February 1962, Cutter reported that it had settled fifty-
four suits for $3,049,000 in which $11,800,000 in damages was origi-
nally asked, and. only six suits of relatively low settlement value re-
mained.'" This ended Cutter's difficulties for all practical purposes. Of
the slightly more than three million dollars paid out, insurance covered
only two million dollars, leaving Cutter to pay the remainder. 7 To do
so, the company arranged bank loans.'"
10. Wall Street Journal, Feb. 16, 1962, at 14, col. 4.
11. Gottsdanker v. Cutter Laboratories, 182 Cal. App. 2d 602, 6 Cal. Rptr. 320
(1960).
12. Wall Street Journal, June 28, 1961, at 12, col. 4.
13. Wall Street Journal, Feb. 16, 1962, at 14, col. 4.
14. Wall Street Journal, June 7, 1961, at 15, col. 3.
15. Id.
16. Wall Street Journal, Feb. 16, 1962, at 15, col. 3.
17. Id.
18. Wall Street Journal, Nov. 14, 1961, at 32, col. 4.
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Though not a complete indication of the financial impact of the
vaccine suits on Cutter, a look at the company's sales and net income
figures from 1958 through 1964 is useful:








During each year in this period Cutter experienced a significant in-
crease in sales; however, it is apparent that in 1960 and 1961, the two
years during which nearly all of its damage claims were settled, the
company's profits suffered sharp declines. Further, it is also apparent
that with its legal problems rectified, Cutter was able to rebound from
its declines in earnings. More important is a comparison of the amount
of the damage claims to Cutter's total asserts. The $11.8 million dol-
lars in claims equalled about two-thirds of the company's 1961 assets
of $18,376,696,20 the year in which most of the burden was felt. It is
doubtful that a corporation the size of Cutter could survive so serious
a loss.
The drug MER-29 was developed by the Richardson-Merrell
Company to be used to lower the level of cholesterol in the blood.
About a year after its release, clinical reports began to appear in which
patients taking MER-29 developed cataracts and other less-serious side
effects such as hair loss and dermatitis.2 ' On May 22, 1962, MER-29
was withdrawn from the market, approximately two years after its
initial clearance for release by the Food and Drug Administration."
Suits were filed throughout the country alleging damage as a result
of taking MER-29. In the first suit to reach trial, a jury returned a
19. MOODY'S INDUSTRIAL MANUAL 213 (1966).
20. MOODY'S INDUSTRIAL MANUAL 775 (1962).
21. Rheingold, Products Liability-The Ethical Drug Manufacturers Liability, 18
RUTGERS L. REV. 947, n.4 (1964) [hereinafter cited as Rheingold]. MER-29 was used
by about 500,000 persons during its two-year stay on the market. Id.
22. Toole v. Richardson, 251 Cal. App. 2d 689, 60 Cal. Rptr. 398 (1967). MER-
29 was initially released in April 1960 by the FDA.
[Vol. 23
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verdict for Richardson-Merrell,2 but the company did not remain so
fortunate. Judgments in substantial amounts were awarded various
plaintiffs, e.g., $1,205,000 in a New York State Supreme Court,2
$117,000 in a New York federal court,2 $425,000 in a San Francisco
Superior Court, 21 $150,000 in a Seattle federal courtY The number of
damage claims based on the side effects of MER-29 was staggering,
with the company reporting 1,410 claims as of March 1966.2 At that
time, 650 claims had been settled and 760 claims were still outstanding,
of which 650 were in litigation. 9
Thalidomide was a tranquilizer initially produced in Germany
under various trade names.30 The Richardson-Merrell Company under-
took to produce thalidomide in the United States under the trade name
of Kevadon, and on September 12, 1960, the company filed its new
drug application with the FDA. Despite FDA findings that the new
drug application was incomplete, the drug remained in limited use,
although it retained its investigational status and was never cleared for
use in the United States as a prescription drug.31 Following reports of
23. Wall Street Journal, June 19, 1964, at 15, col. 3.
24. New York Times, Nov. 9, 1966, at 41, col. 5.
25. Wail Street Journal, March 9, 1966, at 8 col. 4. The S 100,000 punitive damages
in the verdict was later reversed in Roginsky v. Richardson-Merrell, 378 F.2d 832 (2d
Cir. 1967), leaving only the $17,500 compensatory award. More importantly, the court
considered the implication of large punitive awards to the drug industry as a whole. It
found the issue of large punitive damages to be one of
extreme significance not only in monetary terms to this defendant in view
of the hundreds of MER-29 actions and to the plaintiff as well, but from
a longer range, to the entire pharmaceutical industry and to all present and
potential users of drugs .... 378 F.2d at 838.
The court thought it-was incongruous that the maximum criminal penalty in fines was
only $10,000; whereas, punitive damages awarded to hundreds of plaintiffs could run into
tens of millions of dollars. The court had the "gravest difficulty in perceiving how claims
for punitive damages in such a multiplicity of actions throughout the nation can be so
administered as to avoid overkill." 378 F.2d at 839.
26. Wall Street Journal, March 10, 1966, at 7, col. 1. The verdict was reduced from
$625,000 by the trial judge, who cut punitive damages by half. Id. See Toole v. Richard-
son-Merrell, 251 Cal. App. 2d 689, 60 Cal. Rptr. 398 (1967), affg the trial court award.
27. Wall Street Journal, April 11, 1966, at 25, col. 3.
28. Wall Street Journal, March 10, 1966, at 7, col. 1.
29. Id. Total damages in the MER-29 cases will be discussed infra in conjunction
with damages in the thalidomide cases.
30. Cavers, Administering That Ounce of Prevention: New Drugs and Nuclear
Reactors-I, 68 W. 'VA. L. REV. 109, 113 (1966).
31. Campbell, Civil Liability For Investigational Drugs: Part II, 42 TEMP. L.Q.
289, 291-92 (1969), (hereinafter cited as Campbell).
19711 NOTES
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many thousands of deformed infants born to mothers who had taken
thalidomide during pregnancy, and after the withdrawal of the drug
from the West German, British and Canadian markets, Richardson-
Merrell voluntarily withdrew its product from FDA consideration on
March 8, 1962.32 Nevertheless, according to the FDA, 2,528,412 tablets
of thalidomide were distributed to 1,267 physicians in the United
States.3 About three thousand clinical complaints alleging damage due
to thalidomide were filed by parents and other adults.3' In Philadelphia
in the first such suit filed, parents asked for $2,486,050 for the deformi-
.ties of their eighteen-month-old son.33 Similar suits were brought in
Cleveland and Cincinnati, asking $2.2 million for one child and $4.1
million on behalf of two children, respectively."
It was estimated that the amount of claims against Richardson-
Merrell for both MER-29 and thalidomide was in excess of 355 mil-
lion,37 with thalidomide claims making up an estimated $25 million of
that figure.1s Of course this astronomical amount of claims was sub-
stantially reduced by settlement. Richardson-Merrell refused to state
the exact amount spent in settlement; however, an attorney coordinat-
ing claims against the company estimated in March 1966, that $ 10-15
million had been paid out. 39 The company refused to disclose the
amount of its products liability insurance coverage; however, it did
state that its coverage was exhausted in February 1967, and as a result
it incurred unindemnified settlement costs of $6,860,827 in fiscal
1967.40
Unlike Cutter, Richardson-Merrell's earnings growth was not
impeded. 4 A look at the company's net sales and net income for the
years 1960 through 1968 bears out this statement:
32. Id. at 292.
33. Id. at 293.
34. Id. at 292.
35. Wall Street Journal, Oct. 8, 1962, at 4, col. 2. The suit was subsequently settled
about six and a half years later for an undisclosed amount. See Wall Street Journal,
March 13, 1969, at 20, col. 3.
36. New York Times, March 24, 1964, at 17, col. 1; New York Times, Dec. 16,
1964, at 33, col. 8.
37. Wall Street Journal, March 10, 1966, at 7, col. i.
38. Campbell, supra note 31, at 292.
39. Wall Street Journal, March 10, 1966, at 7, col. 1.
40. Wall Street Journal, Sept. 18, 1967, at 32, col. 2. The exhausted coverage
situation applied only to insurance coverage for the years 1961 and 1962. Other years
were said to have ample coverage, but this coverage would take effect only after Richard-
son-Merrell had paid some of its own funds. Id.
41. See Wall Street Journal, March 10, 1966, at 7, col. I.
[Vol. 23
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NOTES










Although more than $6.8 million in excess of insurance coverage is a
tremendous deficit to absorb, it is not unmanageable for Richardson-
Merrell when compared to its 1967 earnings of $25.7 million, the year
of the deficit. However, the initial claims of more the $355 million
exceeds the 1967 assets of $255,761,302 by nearly $100 million, clearly
enough to destroy the company if such claims could be sustained. 3
Such exposure to liability is likely to have an inhibiting effect on the
progressive policies of drug manufacturers as a whole. This fear of
liability to a patient has already caused the Veteran's Administration
(VA) some difficulty in securing equipment and drugs for research
purposes. Research was delayed for several months on one occasion
because the producer of a plasma expander refused to allow the ex-
pander's use on human subjects without some protection from liabil-
ity." In an attempt to balance the rights of the deserving victim
against possible economic chaos in the drug industry, the following




Traditionally, when it has been felt that damages in a particular
type of litigation have become excessive, either as a windfall to the
plaintiff or as too great a burden for the defendant, legislative bodies
have set arbitrary limits on maximum recovery.
The best-known examples of such a limitation are state wrongful
death statutes which establish an arbitrary ceiling on damages recover-
42. MOODY'S INDUSTRIAL MANUAL 2021 (1969).
43. Id.
44. Campbell, supra note 31, at 349.
1971]
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able for the life of a person killed by the wrongful act of another. At
present, eight states have such limits.45 An example of concerted activ-
ity on the part of an industry to limit damages with respect to its
particular risk is the airline industry. There is a growing move to limit
damages recoverable in commercial airline crashes since these crashes
have obvious potential for very large damage claims. 6 The introduction
of planes with larger and larger passenger capacity increases this possi-
bility. Arguments against limitation in the airline industry have some
application to the drug industry, and, of course, the drug industry has
its own factors mitigating against limitation.
In the first place, where there is fault, a limitation on damages
counters the tort law notion that the tortfeasor must bear the burden
of his wrongful act. 7 Directly in point is the negligence of Richardson-
Merrell in its production and marketing of MER-29. Even when the
recovery is based on implied warranty, as against Cutter in
Gottsdanker, there remains the idea of a promisor who has broken a
promise (albeit implied in law), and thus should bear the resulting
burden of injury and damage.
Second, the argument that individual states already impose a max-
imum recovery in wrongful death actions and that therefore such a
limit should exist in drug injury cases is not compelling. The number
of states maintaining such limits has decreased to the present number
of eight mentioned above."8 In addition, existing ceiling amounts have
been increased, 5 thus demonstrating the general disfavor of limita-
tions.
Third, the victim must be considered. An arbitrary limitation on
damages bears no relation to actual damage caused by a defective drug.
A rough indication of this is demonstrated by the MER-29 cases.
Where liability was found, damage awards ranged from $1.2 million'"
45. Kriendler, Limitation on Liability In Aircraft Crashes, 36 J. AIR L. & Com.
467, n.9 at 468 (1970). The states are Kansas ($35,000) Massachusetts (S40,000), Minne-
sota ($35,000), Missouri ($50,000), New Hampshire ($60,000), Virginia ($75,000), Vest
Virginia ($110,000), and Wisconsin ($35,000). Id.
46. Id. at 467.
47. Id. at 468.
48. Id. at 468.
49. Id. at 469. For example, West Virginia increased her damage ceiling from
$20,000 in 1961 to $110,000 in 1969. Id. at n. 10 at 469.
50. See note 24 supra.
[Vol. 23
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NOTES
to $1 17,5001 in litigated cases. Adequate compensation is based on a
myriad of independent variables interacting in countless combinations
too complex to be realistically governed by a damage ceiling.
Finally, even with an artificial limitation, the drug industry has no
way of predicting the number of plaintiffs it will encounter. This is
because the extent of distribution of a problematic drug is not easily
predicted.5" It may reach millions of patients or just a few thousand,
depending on when the injurious side effect manifests itself in damage
to a consumer.
There remains to be considered a more flexible limitation analo-
gous to the one used in admiralty for more than a century. The purpose
in admiralty was to encourage the shipping industry by limiting the
risks of loss from major marine disasters.5 3 The thought was that the
risk of catastrophic loss was so great that it must be limited to avoid
discouraging investment in a socially useful field.54 In general, the fed-
eral statute limits the liability of the shipowner for all claims arising
out of a marine mishap, including personal injury and property dam-
age, to the owner's investment in the ship or up to $60 per ton if the
investment is insufficient to cover damages. 5
In the drug industry, the damage could be related in some way to
the product involved. One procedure would be to limit liability for non-
negligent injury to a given percentage of the manufacturer's net sales
of the liability-causing product in the year in which the injury occurred.
Alternatively, the damage ceiling might be set at the figure beyond
which is no longer possible or economically feasible to insure against
loss. 6 Such a limitation would apply only in cases of catastrophic loss
due to injuries caused by a particular product. The objective of this plan
would be to provide a source of reasonable recovery for injured con-
sumers, but at the same time make the manufacturer's risk finite and
calculable.57 If this finite number of dollars was distributed pro rata to
all bona fide claimants, individual recoveries might be diminished to
51. See note 25 supra.
52. Willis, supra note 1, at 662.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id. at n.35. See 42 U.S.C. § 183 (1970).
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some extent, but at least a first few enormous awards would not leave
later claimants with no drug company to proceed against.',
In short, a static statutory limitation on damages is undesirable
from the point of view of the seriously injured consumer, while a flexi-
ble statute geared to the financial status of the drug company could
provide adequate recovery for injury while insuring continuation of a
progressive drug industry.
B. Insurance
Drug companies do carry products liability insurance and in very
large, though sometimes inadequate amounts as shown by the Cutter
and Richardson-Merrell experiences. Obviously, no company would
deliberately under-insure if it thought it would probably incur inordi-
nate losses, but there is a point at which extra amounts of insurance
are not an economically justifiable corporate expense when balanced
against the probabilities of catastrophic damage awards. The private
insurance industry, too, has its problems with products liability insur-
ance; it must determine the probability of liability and set its premiums
accordingly.
The insurance company and its actuaries must operate on the
premise that the future will be much like the past, containing the same
rough number of usual and unusual events," or more simply, insurance
is based on hindsight. In dealing with abnormally large claims of a
business, as where a business has one $100,000 claim when its normal
is $1,000, the large claim is minimized by the actuary and reduced to
a lower figure, since he must consider the one abnormal claim to be
the product of chance."0 To this extent, it seems that the risk is pre-
dicted without full regard for the large sum, an important considera-
tion in an expanding research-oriented drug industry. Still, the drug
industry has relied heavily on products liability insurance, and for the
most part the standard coverage has been satisfactory, witfi Cutter and
Richardson-Merrell standing as notable exceptions. However, the size
of claims that insurance companies must now meet has alarmed the
58. Id. at 663.
59. Morris, Enterprise Liability and The Actuarial Process-The Insignificance of
Foresight, 70 YALE L.J. 554, 574 (1961) (hereinafter cited as Morris).
60. Id. at 562.
[Vol. 23
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insurance industry. Thus, it may become increasingly difficult for drug
companies to obtain adequate coverage for the possible $10 to $20
million claims that are within the realm of possibility.6 The only alter-
natives for the insurance companies are higher premiums or lower
limits of liability, 2 neither of which accommodates the drug industry's
problem. Although some solution may be feasible through a reap-
praisal and revision of traditional products liability insurance, "in the
final analysis, insurers will cover only calculable risks, while the risk
of products liability appears to be getting less calculable every year.
'6 3
Without commercial insurance, self-insurance may be necessary if the
drug company's assets permit; however, many producers, like Cutter,
will find this impossible because of inadequate assets.64
The problem inherent in trying to cover catastrophic damage
claims against drug producers by using commercial insurance alone
presents economic conflicts that seem basically insoluble. For this rea-
son, some form of government indemnification must be considered as
an alternative to allowing reputable drug companies to be destroyed by
damage claims involving only one problem product.
Such a solution has been enacted at the federal level concerning
indemnification of victims of possible disastrous nuclear reactor acci-
dents. In 1956, the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) commissioned
a study to determine the extent of damage, and hence liability, in the
event of a large scale nuclear reactor accident. 5 Though it discounted
the findings as somewhat overly-pessimistic, Congress enacted the
Price-Anderson amendments to the Atomic Energy Act.6 The Act now
requires every nuclear reactor operator, each a licensee of the federal
government, to carry insurance in the amount of $74 million. Coupled
with this is $486 million of governmental indemnity to cover liability
61. Willis, supra note 1, at 657.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. See note 20 supra; See 13 STAN. L. REv. at 648.
65. Cavers, Administering That Ounce of Prevention: New Drugs and Nuclear
Reactors-H, 68 W. VA. L. REv. 233, 234 (1966) (citing Theoretical Possibilities and
Consequences of Major Accidents in Large Nuclear Power Plants, I CCH ATOM. EN.
L. REP. 4031 (1957)) (hereinafter cited as Cavers-I 1).
66. Cavers-II at 234; See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2014 & 2210 (1970).
67. Cavers-lI at 235, nn.5 & 6; See 42 U.S.C. § 2210 (1970).
19711 NOTES
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in excess of insurance. Finally, a maximum liability ceiling of $560
million is established.
Recognizing that drug companies are indeed subject to cata-
strophic losses, a plan similar to the nuclear accident coverage offers a
viable alternative to commercial insurance." Under such a plan, a drug
producer would be required to obtain and maintain a certain amount
of private insurance coverage based on some variable such as gross
sales or quantity of drugs produced. If the insurer and manufacturer
incurred liability in excess of the coverage, governmental aid would be
available.69 The prospect of some liability, which would naturally raise
insurance costs, would encourage due care on the part of producers, but
the availability of governmental aid in emergencies would prevent
undue discouragement of new products research. T0
Carrying the above proposal one step further, the government
could accept full financial responsibility for injured parties through
legislation affording compensation." Such a proposal was made re-
garding the victims of the Cutter-Salk vaccine mishap.72 Indeed, some
drug manufacturers have considered some governmental aid as a possi-
ble solution in extraordinary risk situations."3 A system of complete
governmental indemnification would be socially expensive, although it
would offer both plaintiff and the defendant the ideal outcome. The
social expense is that, in the final analysis, the burden would be borne
by the entire population in higher taxes. In addition, further govern-
mental encroachment in the industry may be undesirable to drug manu-
facturers as a whole. Lastly, the drug company is offered no incentive
to use utmost care in its manufacturing and marketing.
A low-cost medical insurance is another possible alternative.
Though it would not provide compensation comparable to the usual
award in products liability litigation, most claimants would be able to
68. The drug manufacturers and AEC licensees are similar in the fact that the
pharmaceutical products of the former must be licensed and approved for marketing by
a governmental agency, the FDA.
69. 13 STAN. L. REv., supra note 7, at 652.
70. Id.
7!. Campbell, supra note 31, at 346.
72. Id. (citing H.R. 8082, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. (1957)).
73. 13 STAN. L. REv., supra note 7, at n.39.
74. Campbell, supra note 31, at 349.
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NOTES
cover a large portion of their medical expenses from such insurance.75
Such a plan would probably have to be compulsory to afford both the
consumer and the drug company the desired protection. This might
involve incorporating this insurance into Social Security or Medicare,
an unlikely event at this time. Because this plan would probably not
be able to provide complete or even sufficient protection to all consum-
ers, and because it does not offer the traditional legal remedy of pain
and suffering, it is not a satisfactory answer.
If insurance is considered the best solution to the drug industry's
damage problem, it is submitted that some combination of commercial
insurance coupled with governmental indemnification is the only work-
able solution. This alone minimizes the tremendous expense or unavail-
ability of private insurance to cover disastrous losses while at the same
time protecting the drug company against financial destruction or
having to stifle its research efforts.
C. Enterprise Liability-Redistribution of Loss to the Consumer
Under the concept of enterprise liability, a producer of a product
assumes the burden of injury and damage to another party caused by
the producer's product. This burden is thought to be one of the costs
of doing business.7" Through the operation of this theory, a consumer's
loss is shifted to the manufacturer, who is said to be in a unique
position to bear the loss and ultimately redistribute it back to the
consumer by raising prices.77
Advocates of enterprise liability contend that it causes little busi-
ness dislocation while providing important service by offering financial
recompense to the injured consumer or his beneficiaries. And since the
entrepreneur's competitors are exposed to the same liability, no one
suffers a competitive disadvantage.78 To meet the judgement costs, the
producer must either buy insurance or self-insure. The cost of either,
like all costs of doing business, is reflected in prices. This price rise,
having been spread over all of a company's products, is a negligible
burden to the individual consumer who ultimately pays.
79
75. 13 STAN. L. REV., supra note 7, at n.20.
76. Morris, supra note 59, at 555.
77. Willis, supra note 1, at 655.
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This "natural law-like" statement is an oversimplified approach.
The crux of the theory is an assumption that an increase in a manufac-
turer's product's prices will enable him to recoup his liability losses
from a fixed broad consumer base. This assumption ignores the fact
that a price increase may significantly affect consumer demand and
result in less sales. Consequently, there may be no relative improvement
in the manufacturer's initial position of being saddled with excessive
costs from products liability damages.8" Thus, depending upon the in-
dustry's demand curve, the cost of enterprise liability will be divided
between the consumer and the industry with the former suffering some
increase in product price, and the latter, some decrease in sales vol-
ume."' If, instead, prices are not increased, sales would remain stable,
but the industry would necessarily absorb a decline in earings. Some
companies, e.g. Richardson-Merrell, might be able to live with this in
the short run; however, the weaker components of the industry, e.g.
Cutter, might be driven out of business.
The drug industry in particular may not be a good example of an
enterprise subject to price-responsive demand fluctuations. A small
price increase in an effort to absorb liability losses may not lead to a
significant decrease in sales of a certain product or to the use of substi-
tutes by consumers. One reason is that many drugs are patented and,
therefore, are not available from another source.12 Another reason is
that the consumer often is not involved in any selection process between
competing products. This is the case when a doctor prescribes a certain
drug after diagnosing a patient's ailment. The patient does not know
the merits of a drug or its price; he gets the prescription filled and takes
it. But the drug industry presents a more fundamental problem to the
enterprise liability advocate. The chain of events in the enterprise liabil-
ity sequence is as follows: liability is incurred; the manufacturer pays
the damages either with commercial insurance or through self-
80. The manufacturer's prices are determined by supply and demand factors. With
a stable demand, a company will decrease its sales if it increases its prices. The extent of
sales loss is determined by the slope of the demand curve. A relatively flat demand curve
coupled with a rise in prices will bring about a sharp decrease in sales volume. However,
if the demand curve is relatively steep, a rise in prices will have much less effect on sales.
Morris, supra note 59, at 585.
81. Id.
82. Rheingold, supra note 21, at n.373.
[Vol. 23
14
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 23, Iss. 5 [1971], Art. 4
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol23/iss5/4
NOTES
insurance; the consumer pays, and the costs are covered. If the com-
mercial insurance cannot be bought in the quantity desired, or if the
price of insurance is too high so that the manufacturer either takes the
risk or self-insures, the manufacturer may be out of business before a
price increase can recoup his losses. Therefore, it is questionable
whether or not the enterprise liability theory offers any solution at all
to the ever increasing damage problem of the drug industry.
III. SUMMARY
The problem of how drug companies are to pay astronomical
damages to consumers injured by their products is not hypothetical.
The difficulty is compounded by judicial findings of liability without
fault which make the incidence of liability unpredictable. The Cutter
and Richardson-Merrell experiences demonstrate that dire financial
consequences are neither impossible, nor improbable to the affected
manufacturer. The social utility of a progressive, research-oriented
drug industry cannot be seriously questioned, and some accommoda-
tion should be made to insure its continued progress. Conversely, the
injured plaintiff should be adequately compensated. A denial of com-
pensation to him out of regard for the industry's financial plight is
antithetical to modern philosophy of the place of industry in society
today. The thalidomide baby and the paralyzed polio victim are enti-
tled to compensation for their suffering, inconvenience and extra cost
of just being alive in this unfortunate condition.
It is submitted that an artificial limitation on damages recoverable
by a drug victim is not workable from the victim's point of view. A
static ceiling cannot adequately compensate every deserving plaintiff
unless it is too high to offer the manufacturer the relief he is seeking.
Even a formula related to the company's earnings or investment in a
product, such as the admiralty analogy, is subject to this basic short-
coming.
Nor does enterprise liability offer a solution. Although interesting
hypothetically, when applied to the drug industry's damage problem,
it is likely that the company in question may be bankrupt before the
enterprise liability logic will allow it to recoup its losses. Remaining
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are plaintiffs who are short on compensation and a defendant who is
out of business.
The prospect of covering all losses with private insurance alone is
no more encouraging. Either the insurance company's liability cover-
age limit will be too low to afford adequate protection, or the price of
adequate coverage will be so high as to be economically unfeasible for
the manufacturer. The same reasoning applies to any form of medical
insurance held by the consumer.
Complete government indemnification suffers from being socially
expensive to the country as a whole, disagreeable to drug manufactur-
ers who want no more government control, and lacking in incentive to
the producer to exercise the most possible care.
It is suggested that the most complete solution is a system of
insurance secured by drug producers from private sources, coupled with
indemnification by the federal government for extraordinary losses.
First, the consumer is protected. Second, the producer is inspired to use
due care in his business since he must pay the cost of his private
insurance. This insurance becomes more expensive if the producer be-
comes a bad risk. Third, the drug company is protected against finan-
cial destruction. And last, the progressive nature of a research-oriented
drug industry is not stifled, and society as a whole can continue to share
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